Transcript: Sen. Carl Levin Holds A Hearing On U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan And Pakistan Senate Committee on Armed Services

LEVIN:  Good morning, everybody.  The committee receives testimony this morning on the new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan announced by President Obama last Friday.

Our witnesses this morning each have contributed to developing that strategy.  Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy, who will be with us in a few -- few minutes, was one of three administration officials who led the interagency panel that examined U.S. policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Their review drew on and benefited from a number of earlier policy reviews, including one by U.S. Central Command led by CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus, who also join us this morning.

And we have with us Admiral Eric Olson, commander, Special Operations Command.

Ms. Flournoy, General Petraeus and Admiral Olson will play a central role in implementing the president's new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.  And our thanks go to each of them for their service and for their being with us this morning...........

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LEVIN:  Thank you, Senator Chambliss.

Senator Webb?

WEBB:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Flournoy, let me start by asking you a question.

First, I would say I appreciate what the president was saying when he talked about focusing this strategy more directly toward countering insurgency and eliminating the presence of the Taliban.

At the same time, I'm a little concerned with how we're going to pull this off with respect to cooperation in Pakistan, whether there really is a true incentive at the right levels in a Pakistani government and military to strongly cooperate with NATO in this effort.  It's been reported, I think, Arnold Deborgrov (ph) is probably the most comprehensive -- does the most comprehensive reporting in terms of the situation in Pakistan.  He has a piece, actually, this morning on this pointing out that Pakistani intelligence inspired and nurtured the Taliban movement with a view of taking over Afghanistan in the wake of the Soviet defeat in 1989; that there are currently, according to Mr. Deborgrov (ph), Pakistani intelligence agents operating in Afghanistan to support the Taliban.

How are we going to address that situation?

FLOURNOY:  Senator, I think it is an open question and I think we need to test the proposition.  And I think one of the things that is a

-- that is changing in the Pakistan context is the degree to which the threat is manifesting itself within Pakistan at a level that is really effecting public attitudes, that is effecting leadership attitudes, et cetera.

So I have we need to test the proposition by -- and the way we do that is to put a substantial offer of assistance and a substantial commitment to work with them to take this on, to reduce tensions elsewhere in the region so they can refocus and take this on.  I think we need to test the proposition, but I also think we need to -- this is where the metrics become very important -- we need to monitor their performance, their actual track record in implementing the necessary steps.  I think that's the point where we are and that's what this strategy recommends going forward.

WEBB:  I would also submit that there should be ways to try to measure the true incentive, not simply from the current top leadership in Pakistan but from other elements that have considerable power in Pakistan.  This is a situation that we have been monitoring for some time on a committee level rather than on an operational level, but there's been considerable reporting that, for instance, the Pakistani military operating in these tribal areas has had a fairly soft hand when it comes to Taliban as opposed to Al Qaida in the apprehensions that they've made and the operations that they've conducted.  So I think this, clearly, should be on our radar screen in terms of truly measuring the -- the incentives and the intentions in Pakistan.

How are we going to know when our national task is finished?  And I would ask Secretary Flournoy to answer that and then, General, or Admiral, if you'd like to add in.  How are we going to know?  What is the end point?  Actually, I think General Petraeus is kind of famous for having asked this question at the very beginning of the Iraq war to a reporter.  How with we going to know when this is over?  How does this end?

FLOURNOY:  Sir, I'll give you may answer and then let the person who asked the question try to give his.

But I think that a key point of defining success is when both the Afghans and the Pakistanis have both the capability and the will to deal with the remaining threats themselves.  That the period of extraordinary intervention and assistance comes to a transition point and we go to a more long-term, you know, normal development assistance relationship with both countries.

To me it is when we have reduced the threat and built that capacity locally to the point where they can be much more self-reliant in managing this problem.

WEBB:  That puts us sort of at the mercy of their policies. General, can you give me a more practical answer to that?

PETRAEUS:  Well, I -- I guess I'd echo that...

WEBB:  Or maybe more mechanical.  What physically -- how are we going to know?

PETRAEUS:  Well, I think, again, frankly, in Iraq we have known when we were able to transition responsibilities to not just the Iraqi security forces but to other institutions of the Iraqi government.

Now, Afghanistan is a very different country.  It does not have some of the blessings, certainly, that Iraq has when it comes to oil and revenue.  But nonetheless, the task will be for them to shoulder the responsibilities of their own security and other responsibilities of governance.

WEBB:  When -- when is the last time that Afghanistan had an actual functioning national army that could clearly be said to be in control of operations inside its own country?

PETRAEUS:  Probably more than 30 years ago, I would think, Senator.

WEBB:  At least.  If then.

PETRAEUS:  Right.  In the '70s, in that period.

And, certainly, it was a combination of security arrangements.

But I think that as a student of history as well, that you would agree that between the period most recently, for example, of say 1900 and again in the 1970s that there was a -- in Afghanistan, there was a conception of a nation state and that there was the exercise of governance within an Afghan model that did exist.

And, of course, it's been the intervening more than three decades of war that have done so much to damage all that.

WEBB:  I would say, perhaps, a brief period more than 30 years ago for about 30 years you could say that there was some sort of a functioning national army in Afghanistan not previous to that and not since.  And it's a little bit different in terms of the challenge even that we were facing in Iraq.

My time is up, but I would like to ask one other question that goes along with this.

When you're talking about this policy of living among the people, holding areas that have been cleared, who do we anticipate are actually going to hold these areas?

PETRAEUS:  Well, it will literally vary from location to location.  The options, of course, are local police, their version of national police, the national civil order police can assist with that, and then the Afghan national army, as well as now the Afghan public protection force, which is a pilot program, just concluded the first iteration of this.

About 240 or so members graduated and they'll be partnered with Special Forces.  We'll learn, undoubtedly, some hard lessons from this effort and apply them as we carry out subsequent of these.

This is not quite a Sons of Iraq.  In fact, it's actually a more institutionalized and, frankly, more rigorous Sons of Iraq program, because it included weeks of training, specific equipping, and then a specific partner force.

But that is how we would see that.  If I could, also, Senator, there is also a difference in the way we literally live with the people in Afghanistan.  In Iraq, where we plunked ourselves down, as you know, and your son did, that is not as likely here, given the much greater rural population than urban population and it will probably be more likely that in coordination with tribal elders and the local mullahs that we'll actually occupy on the edge of a community, not literally right in the center of it.

WEBB:  That largely will depend on the confidence and the will power of the local Afghanis.

PETRAEUS:  Exactly.

WEBB:  Thank you.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

LEVIN:  Thank you, Senator Webb.

Senator Sessions?

 

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